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ABSTRACT
The process of economic integration has made 
considerable progress during the 1990s. in the 
European Union (EU). Firstly, with the establishment 
of a single market in 1993 and now, within a 
relatively short period of time, the most significant 
yet, the movement towards a single currency for 
participating Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
members on 1 January 1999. This will have a major 
impact not only upon participating, and indeed non 
participating EU members, but also global financial 
markets in general with the establishment of a single 
currency (the euro) which has the potential to rival 
the US dollar as a major international reserve 
currency. The paper focuses upon the progress and 
potential problems arising from the establishment of 
EMU in the EU, and in doing so proceeds as follows. 
Firstly a brief review of recent developments in the EU 
is conducted focusing upon the framework for 
establishing EMU, the Maastricht Treaty. Secondly, 
economic theory and empirical evidence is analysed 
to establish whether the EU satisfies the necessary 
conditions for an optimum currency area. Thirdly, the 
prospects for the establishment of EMU on 1 
January 1999 as well as its prospective members is 
identified. Finally, and importantly, the prospective 
global economic and financial implications arising 
from the establishment of a single currency for the 
EMU area is considered.
1. INTRODUCTION
The process of European economic integration has received much 
attention in recent years arising from four major developments, 
primarily within the context of the European Union (EU). Firstly, 
the establishment of a Single European Market (SEM)1 has 
contributed to the free movement of labour, capital, goods and 
services between member countries arising from the gradual 
elimination of non tariff barriers. Secondly, and seen as a logical 
extension to reap the benefits of the first, there has been extensive 
movement towards the establishment of Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU)2 between EU member countries with the intended 
irrevocable fixing of exchange rates, the eventual replacement of 
national currencies by a single European currency, and the 
establishment of a supranational European Central Bank (ECB) 
responsible for the conduct of European monetary policy. Thirdly, 
the prospective enlargement of the EU with membership from the 
former centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern 
Europe3 and the republics of the former Soviet Union and, 
perhaps, eventually Russia itself. Finally, in Western Europe, 
most members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 
reached agreement with the EU to form a European Economic 
Area (EEA) on 1 January 1994. The EEA allows for the creation 
of an area of free trade for goods, services, labour and capital 
between the member states of the EU and members of EFTA.
This paper focuses upon the progress and problems arising 
from the attainment of a crucial component of further integration
From 1 January 1993. In reality the implementation of laws to achieve this 
across individual member countries has extended beyond this date.
The final stage o f EMU is to begin at the latest on 1 January 1999.
By 1997 the EU had received membership applications from ten Central 
and Eastern European countries -  Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
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of the European economy, specifically that of EMU in 1999. It is 
clear that if the full benefits of the single market are to be 
achieved, and, indeed, for the further enlargement of the EU to 
take place, this will crucially depend upon the successful 
attainment of monetary union. The paper proceeds as follows. In 
section 2 a brief review of recent developments in the EU is 
conducted focusing upon that of the Maastricht Treaty, which 
provides the framework for economic and monetary union. 
Section 3 conducts a theoretical and empirical review of the EU 
as an optimum currency area. Section 4 analyses the prospects for 
EMU in 1999 identifying in particular its prospective membership 
from the countries of the EU. Section 5 identifies important 
international economic implications arising from the establishment 
of a single currency for the EMU area. Finally section 6 presents a 
summary of the major conclusions to be derived from this paper.
2. THE MAASTRICHT TREATY AND ECONOMIC AND 
MONETARY UNION
Economic and monetary union has long been an aspiration of the 
European Community. In 1970 the Werner Plan proposed a 
decade long transition to a single currency by 1980. At this time 
the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, which pegged 
the currencies of the major industrial countries to the dollar, was 
still in place. The relative fixity of exchange rates gave plausibility 
to the plan for a single currency within the Community, but the 
proposal came towards the end of the Bretton Woods era at a 
time when rising worldwide inflation and the greatly increasing 
mobility of international capital were making it increasingly 
difficult for governments to maintain fixed parities. Within two 
years of the publication of the Werner Plan, the Bretton Woods 
system had collapsed, and exchange rates started to fluctuate 
markedly against each other. The European Community (EC)
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attempted to create a zone of fixed intra European parities, 
leaving each currency to float against outside currencies such as 
the dollar and the yen. This European currency "snake” was a 
precursor of the European Monetary System that followed in
1979. It quickly failed and thoughts of monetary union were set 
aside as inflation took off in the industrial countries following 
OPEC's decision to raise the price of oil in 1973-74. The resulting 
differences in inflation among European countries made plans for 
monetary union implausible.
In 1979, after nearly a decade of exchange rate turbulence, the 
Community launched the European Monetary System, which was 
intended to make Europe a zone of exchange rate stability. By the 
end of the 1980s the EMS was regarded as a proven success, 
leading many to believe that the system should be developed 
further. Jacques Delors, the then President of the European 
Commission, produced in 1989 the Delors report, which 
proposed once more that the EC move in stages to monetary 
union. This later became enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty. 
However during the foreign exchange crisis of September 1992 
and July 1993, when the UK and Italy were forced out of the 
system as a result of speculative attacks, it seemed that once 
again EMU had fallen victim to financial market speculation and 
exchange rate instability. However this did not deter members of 
the EU from continuing the process towards EMU.
The Maastricht Treaty
At the Maastricht summit in December 1991 the heads of state or 
government of the EU agreed on far reaching proposals for the 
transition to a single currency (to be later called the euro) and the 
establishment of a European System of Central Banks. In addition 
to the agreement on EMU the summit also agreed on a treaty that: 
formally established the European Union; committed the EU
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members to strive for closer cooperation on foreign and security 
policy; and slightly expanded the powers of the European 
Parliament. The member states, with the exception of the UK, 
also agreed to work toward minimum requirements for social 
policies outside the treaty framework.4 The monetary union was 
to be reached in three stages as outlined in the report of the 
Delors Committee issued in April 1989. During Stage I which 
began on July 1,1990 all EU countries were: to join the European 
Monetary System; the single market was to be completed; there 
was to be closer economic cooperation and a strengthening of 
competition policies. In Stage II which began on 1 January 1994 
member countries endeavoured to achieve greater convergence of 
their economies as measured by four criteria: inflation; long term 
interest rates; exchange rate stability; and sustainability of the 
fiscal position. At the beginning of this stage a new institution the 
European Monetary Institute (EMI) was established, replacing the 
Committee of Central Bank Governors. The EMI is directed and 
managed by a Council consisting of the governors of the central 
banks of the member states and a President appointed by the 
European Council. Although the EMI is not responsible for 
monetary policy it provides a forum for strengthening the 
coordination of monetary policies of the member states. The EMI 
also promotes greater cooperation in all aspects of central bank 
policy; facilitates the use of the ECU5 and oversees the smooth 
functioning of the ECU clearing system; prepares the instruments 
and procedures necessary for carrying out a single monetary 
policy in the third stage; and supervises the technical preparation 
of the euro bank notes. The European Monetary Institute is 
effectively the forerunner of the ECB.
4 Referred to as the Social Chapter. The UK later joined in May 1997 under 
the new Labour Government.
5 European currency unit.
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At the start of Stage III, which could begin as early as 1997 but 
no later than 1 January 1999, member states which satisfied the 
convergence criteria would participate in the final stage, and 
would irrevocably fix their exchange rates (no bands) and 
subsequently introduce a single currency. Other members would 
join once their economies were found to meet the necessary 
conditions (a multi-track system was envisaged). The UK and 
Denmark, however, retained the right not to join the monetary 
union. The EMI will be replaced by a European Central Bank 
(ECB) which, together with the central banks of the member 
states, will form the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). 
The basic tasks of the ESCB will be to formulate and implement 
the monetary policy of the Community; conduct foreign exchange 
operations; hold and manage the official reserves of the member 
states; and promote the smooth operation of the payments 
systems. The ECB would be totally independent and have full 
power to control EU monetary policy, with national central banks 
becoming, in effect, branch offices of the ECB. The EU Council of 
Finance Ministers (Ecofin) would decide exchange rate policy, 
leading to potential conflict with the ECB. In the area of fiscal 
policy the EU would be required to limit members' budget deficits, 
hence the subsequent agreement on a stability and growth pact.
The Maastricht Treaty firmly established that the primary 
objective of monetary and exchange rate policy 'shall be to 
maintain price stability and, without prejudice to this objective, 
to support the general economic policies in the Community, in 
accordance with the principle of an open market economy with 
free competition'. In support of the price stability objective, the 
member states in avoiding excessive budget deficits agreed to 
eliminate central bank financing of public expenditure by the 
beginning of Stage II. They also agreed to make their central banks 
independent of governments by the beginning of Stage III. Once a 
single currency has been adopted the participating member states
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are obliged to continue to avoid excessive budget deficits. 
Procedures were agreed upon that would allow the Council of 
Ministers to take measures against a member state which failed to 
comply with a Council decision that its deficit must be reduced. 
This was to be furthered clarified at the Dublin summit in 
December 1996, and is discussed in more detail below.
For each country the economic conditions for participation in 
the monetary union and adoption of the euro are expressed in 
quantitative, and nominal, terms for a range of indicators:
• consumer price inflation in the year prior to examination 
by the European Council must not exceed by more than
1.5 percentage points the average for the three member 
countries with the lowest inflation rates;
• interest rates on long term government securities must not 
be more than 2 percentage points higher than those in 
the same three member states;
• the currency must have been held within the narrow 
band of the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS for 
two years without a realignment at the initiation of the 
member state in question;
• a sustainable financial position must be attained. This is 
defined as a general government financial deficit no 
greater than 3 percent of GDP and a ratio of public 
debt to GDP of no more than 60 percent.
In the evaluation of progress toward the economic convergence 
criteria the treaty allows for a degree of discretion. In particular, it 
requires a substantial and continuous decline of fiscal deficits 
toward the reference value, while the debt ratio must be 
approaching the benchmark at a "satisfactory pace". The final 
judgement on whether a member state meets the economic criteria 
was to be made by one or more summits of EU heads of state or 
government. The first of these was held in 1996 and had to decide
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as a precondition for EMU to begin in 1997 whether a majority of 
countries had achieved economic convergence. Since this was not 
the case an additional summit will be held in April 1998 to 
determine which, if any, member states satisfy the convergence 
criteria based predominantly on member country performance in 
1997. Stage III in any event will begin I January 1999 at the latest. 
In coming to a decision the summit will also take into account 
other indicators of economic performance such as: unit labour 
costs; the current account of the balance of payments; and the 
integration of markets.
The advocates of a single currency advance the following 
arguments: EMU would eliminate the cost of foreign exchange 
transactions and exchange rate hedging (estimated to be some 
US$30 billion a year); it would help to stabilise international 
currency markets; the elimination of exchange rate uncertainty 
would enhance the efficiency of the price mechanism as a resource 
allocator; the elimination of exchange rate uncertainty would 
stimulate the manufacturing sectors of member countries since 
unpredictable and volatile exchange rates are an incentive for 
resources to be shifted toward the non traded goods sector which 
is not exposed to international competition and is largely 
unaffected by sizeable and unanticipated exchange rate changes; 
the elimination of exchange rate uncertainty would stimulate 
competitive forces in the union and yield benefits in terms of 
higher growth rates of intra union trade and investment; the 
independence of the ECB in the conduct of European monetary 
policy with its primary objective of price stability, will result in 
German style lower inflation and contribute to lower interest 
rates. The latter will have particular benefits for member countries 
that traditionally have had higher inflation.
However, there are a number of serious counter arguments 
including: the beneficial effect on transactions costs are 
exaggerated; the single market would be best improved by
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liberalising Europe's energy and telecom industries and ensuring 
open public sector procurement policies; EMU will mean a loss of 
sovereignty since monetary policy would be set by a 
supranational European central bank, and governments would 
lose the ability to devalue their way out of a crisis; monetary 
policy will have a differential impact across member states 
resulting in stronger economic cycles in some countries in 
comparison to others; EMU will ease the market constraints on 
profligate governments resulting in excessive borrowing and an 
EMU "debt trap"; in a monetary union uncompetitive labour costs 
could no longer be offset by a falling exchange rate, instead 
workers would lose their jobs and be required to move elsewhere 
or have to accept lower wages. This would further exacerbate 
regional income disparities, and skill shortages in relatively poorer 
regions; it will result in a two track EU which will exacerbate 
differences between those members who participate in EMU from 
the beginning from those which initially fail to satisfy the 
convergence criteria. The latter development could fundamentally 
undermine the achievements of the single market, and prevent the 
further enlargement of the EU.
In the following section key theoretical conditions for an 
optimum currency area are considered, as well as a review of the 
empirical literature relating to whether the EU satisfies such 
conditions.
3. THE EU  AS AN OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA -  THEORY AND
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
The theoretical basis of the Maastricht convergence criteria has 
been questioned by economists, both in terms of the choice of 
criteria, which emphasise essentially nominal monetary and fiscal 
factors, as well as the reasons for the limit and band widths of 
the criteria. Given the diversity of opinion over the future role of
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the EU which was apparent at Maastricht, it can be argued that 
the convergence criteria and the limits set for them were based on 
political compromise and not on sound economic principles. 
However, calls for the inclusion of real convergence criteria have 
been made with the most vocal that from the British government 
in the spring of 1995, which argued for the fulfilment of real 
economic convergence criteria in addition to the four monetary 
and fiscal criteria already laid down. This view has support from 
the Maastricht Treaty itself where the first paragraph of Article 
109j requires that "the results of the integration of markets, the 
situation and development of the balances of payments on 
current account and an examination of the development of unit 
labour costs and other price indexes" be taken into account when 
assessing progress towards convergence. The British government 
amongst others viewed the Maastricht monetary and fiscal 
criteria "as a necessary but not a sufficient condition to justify a 
single currency".6
Optimum currency area theory
Attempts to put the British demand for structural convergence 
into practice largely failed although the question still remained as 
to the theoretical justification for making real economic 
convergence a requirement for membership of the EMU. In this 
regard the theory of optimum currency areas provides a 
framework for comparing the economic costs of flexible and fixed 
exchange rate systems. The main cost factor in a system of fixed 
exchange rates is the inability to adjust the exchange rate to 
shocks, and the level of associated costs depends upon the 
availability of alternative adjustment mechanisms. This in turn 
suggests that to make countries conducive to membership of a
Former British Prime Minister John Major in a speech delivered on 3 
February, 1995.
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monetary union requires the existence of certain characteristics to 
minimise the associated costs. Figure I provides a summary of 
these key characteristics, or conditions, which make monetary 
union more, or less, likely.
An exogenous shock which has symmetrical effects upon 
member countries suggests that such members are conducive to 
the formation of a monetary union. Alternatively, if the shocks do 
not have a symmetrical effect upon members it is essential to 
identify whether the causes of this can be reduced. In this regard a 
number of factors can be identified as producing asymmetrical 
effects: immobility of factors of production -  countries with a 
high degree of factor mobility are more likely to be suitable 
candidates for monetary integration since such factor mobility can 
substitute for exchange rate flexibility in the international 
adjustment to shocks; wage and price flexibility- wage and price 
flexibility facilitates adjustment to adverse exogenous shocks and 
reduces the detrimental effects on unemployment and inflation. 
Hence countries with more flexible labour markets are more 
suitable members of a monetary union; fiscal integration -  
budgetary transfer payments between two countries can help 
reduce the negative effects of shocks on real economic activity. 
Currency areas are therefore optimum if there is also a willingness 
to undergo fiscal integration and hence to enter into an economic 
union in general; high degree of economic openness -  open 
economies tend to be suited to systems of fixed exchange rates as 
exchange rate movements have relatively weaker effects on real 
competitiveness. This criterion suggests that smaller countries are 
better suited to monetary union than large countries; 
diversification of production structures -  diversified economies 
are regarded as better candidates for monetary union as a high 
level of diversification offers protection against the effect of 
shocks specific to particular sectors; similarity of production 
structures -  terms of trade shocks have a symmetrical impact in
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countries with similar production structures so that the exchange 
rate is redundant as an adjustment instrument. Therefore 
countries with similar production structures are better candidates 
for monetary union; similar inflation rates -  if inflation rates are 
similar a smooth flow of current account transactions can be 
expected. Consequently, monetary unions are optimum if the 
inflation rates in member states are similar; volatility of real 
exchange rates -  as the previous conditions are difficult to 
quantify it has been suggested that the volatility of real exchange 
rates should be used as an all embracing criterion for admission to 
a monetary union. The smaller real exchange rate fluctuations 
have been in the past the better suited a country is for 
membership of a monetary union; political factors -  the political 
desire for monetary integration is emphasised as a deciding factor 
for the success of a monetary union.
Countries contemplating the establishment of a monetary 
union, and therefore a fixed exchange rate between them, will find 
that this is optimum where the structure of their economies is 
similar, and if markets in goods and factors of production react 
flexibly to real economic changes. Moves towards far reaching 
integration should therefore be undertaken only if the real 
economies of participating countries react to changes with similar 
rapidity and flexibility, and if both the geographical and 
occupational mobility of labour is high. Otherwise shocks will 
have a strongly asymmetrical regional impact. Such criteria 
identified from economic theory focuses upon real rather than 
nominal convergence criteria for the attainment of an optimum 
currency area. This contrasts starkly with the nominal 
convergence criteria identified under the Maastricht Treaty. Hence 
there is a strong theoretical basis for suggesting the inclusion of 
real economic convergence criteria as a means of identifying the 
readiness of member countries for the formation of a monetary 
union.
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Of particular concern regarding the non inclusion of real 
criteria is that if such real convergence is not taking place, and if 
economic and monetary union prevents individual regions 
(countries) from taking specific economic measures in response to 
shocks, there is the likelihood of major regional differences in 
terms of unemployment, incomes and growth. As Figure I 
suggests, as long as economic shocks affect different countries 
differently and as long as sectoral regional labour and/or capital 
mobility are low an optimum currency area cannot be achieved. 
Should such a monetary union still be formed it is likely to lead to 
significant regional unemployment differences, obvious 
international income disparities (core-periphery effects), with the 
increased likelihood of social and political tension. In addition 
growth theory would suggest that wide regional inequalities can 
lead to a reduction in overall long term economic growth.
Empirical evidence
A brief review of the empirical evidence relating to the EU as an 
optimum currency area is now conducted as well as the 
identification of evidence in regard to the extent of labour 
mobility and flexibility in the EU. Table 1 summarises the results 
obtained from a number of empirical studies relating to whether 
the EU constitutes an optimum currency area on the basis of real 
convergence criteria. Overall the results are mixed, and depend 
upon the reference variable chosen. Poloz (1990) compares the 
adjustment of real exchange rates between the regions of Canada, 
as an existing monetary union, with the adjustment in the EU 
countries and finds lower real exchange rate volatility in the EU 
countries. He therefore concludes that a monetary union in Europe 
would not entail higher costs than in Canada. Neumann and von 
Hagen (1994) carried out a corresponding analysis for the regions 
of Germany, and they come to the conclusion that a monetary
12
union would be possible for a core group of countries (Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands). 
While a monetary union comprising all EU countries would entail 
high costs. A study conducted by De Grauwe and Heens (1993) 
reached a similar conclusion.
Figure 1
A Theoretical Flowchart of the Concept of 
Optimum Currency Areas
Are shocks Symmetrical? ■ 
No
Yes
No monetary union! Monetary union!
Source: F. Heinemann: Central Europe and European Monetary 
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Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) compare the correlation of 
shocks to aggregate demand and supply in twelve EU countries 
and eight regions of the USA. They estimate that shocks in the EU 
countries are less highly correlated, and that accordingly 
monetary union in Europe would result in relatively high economic 
costs. On the other hand a monetary union in a core group of 
countries would give rise to costs comparable to those in the 
regions of the USA. Bini-Smaghi and Vori (1992) consider that the 
structure of production in EU countries is more diversified than in 
the regions of the USA so that asymmetrical shocks are less likely 
to occur in Europe than in the USA. This finding is confirmed by 
Cohen and Wyplosz (1989) who show that Germany and France 
are primarily influenced by symmetrical permanent shocks. A 
monetary union between these two countries would therefore be 
feasible. Eichengreen (1992) examines various indicators for a 
monetary union -  real exchange rate variability, labour mobility, 
relative share prices -  and compares the European performance 
with that of the USA and Canada. According to his findings a 
monetary union in Europe would entail higher costs than in the 
existing monetary unions in the USA and Canada. De Grauwe 
and van Haverbecke (1993) compare the adjustment mechanism 
at the regional level with that at the national level in a number of 
EU countries, and find that labour mobility plays an important 
role at the regional level whereas at the national level adjustment 
occurs mainly via changes in real exchange rates. They argue that 
a monetary union in Europe would have to be accompanied by 
increased labour mobility. In the absence of such mobility a 
monetary union would be in danger of triggering polarisation 
tendencies.
H. Erkel-Rousse and J. Melitz (1995) apply a structural VAR 
approach to data for six European countries (France, Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom). First they 
find that the correlation of shocks across countries is very low.
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This finding is in line with other empirical evidence indicating the 
empirical relevance of asymmetric shocks. Secondly, they analyse 
the importance of fiscal and monetary policies as a measure of 
response to asymmetric shocks. They find, first, that fiscal 
policies contribute significantly to output performance in all 
countries except Germany. Second, and of particular interest, they 
find that monetary policies do not contribute significantly to 
output performance except in Germany. This latter result 
indicates that monetary policy in these countries has no value as 
a stabilisation device and implies that the adoption of a common 
currency for those countries would impose much lower economic 
costs than previously believed. This work suggests that the mere 
existence of asymmetric shocks is not a sufficient argument 
against a currency union, because monetary policy may not after 
all be a useful tool for response to such shocks.
Regional labour mobility and flexible labour markets are 
important to the efficiency of a monetary union. Fatas and 
Decressin (1995) analyse the mechanism for adjustment to 
changes in the demand for labour across European regions. 
According to their findings, changes in labour demand in Europe 
are not offset by labour mobility across regions, as in the USA, 
but mainly by an age or gender specific decline in labour 
participation rates. On the other hand Eichengreen (1993) 
examined regional unemployment in England and Italy and 
showed that adjustment to changes in relative price occurs in 
much the same way as in the regions of the USA. Schmidt and 
Straubhaar (1995) conduct an analysis of the coefficients of 
variation of unemployment rates for various groupings of EU 
countries since 1969 which are shown to be significant and barely 
to have declined over the period studied and suggestive of low 
labour mobility in the EU.
Finally, Heinemann (1995) focuses on the issue of the degree of 
cyclical correlation between the economies of Europe. For a
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successful European monetary union it is helpful if potential 
members of the common currency area have a high degree of 
cyclical correlation. Germany is taken as the reference economy. 
His results indicate, in particular, a core of economies around 
Germany: France, Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands, which 
are not only cyclically close to Germany but have also a similar 
order of magnitude of cyclical fluctuation. He concludes from this 
analysis that these economies appear to be ideal candidates for 
the formation of a monetary union.
4. PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION IN 
1999
At an intergovernmental summit to be held in April 1998 the 
member nations of the EU will be required to determine, on the 
basis of a qualified majority, those member countries which 
satisfy the Maastricht criteria, and can therefore proceed to form 
an economic and monetary union. This will be based primarily on 
their performance in 1997 but will also consider prospective 
developments in 1998 and subsequently. This section identifies 
the prospects of EMU amongst these members. In doing so it 
reviews the recent performance of these countries focusing upon 
the key criteria of inflation, long term interest rates, general 
government budgetary position and general government gross 
debt.
Convergence of price stability
Table 2 summarises the inflation performance of EU members 
covering the period 1991-97 as well as the reference value below 
which EMU participating economies would be required to satisfy. 
This is based on the arithmetic average inflation rate of the three 
best performing countries plus 1.5 percentage points. The average
17
of the three best performing countries it is argued can provide a 
good starting point for the assessment of compliance with the 
reference value if there are no outliers. It is noticeable from this 
table that major success has been achieved in reducing CPI 
inflation in the EU countries since 1991, and particularly so in 
countries such as Greece, Portugal, Sweden and the UK. In 
addition this reduction in inflation has occurred in conjunction 
with a convergence of inflation rates across member states. A 
number of underlying factors can be identified as having 
contributed to this overall trend. Firstly there has been a move 
among member countries to orient their monetary policies 
increasingly towards the objective of price stability, and towards 
central bank independence. Secondly, increased competition has 
arisen from the development of the single market as well as 
globally. Thirdly, labour market reforms in some countries as well 
as the recession of the early 1990s contributed to an easing of 
price and cost pressures. Fourthly, Maastricht criteria pressures 
to attain a fiscally sustainable policy focused upon the need to 
reduce fiscal deficits and debt ratios which is conducive to the 
maintenance of price stability over the longer term. Finally, the 
liberalisation of domestic and international financial markets has 
also contributed towards price stability.
From Table 2 it can be observed that by 1996 four countries -  
Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal did not satisfy the Maastricht 
inflation criteria. However the key performance year will be that 
of 1997. Forecasts for the inflation performance of EU members 
for 1997 are also contained in Table 2, based upon those of the 
European Commission and the Economist Intelligence Unit. Both 
are in agreement that most countries will satisfy the criteria or 
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Convergence of long-term interest rates
Long-term interest rate developments for the EU countries over 
the period 1991-97 are contained in Table 3. This shows ten year 
government bond yields for each country as well as the 
Maastricht reference value for each year for this variable. Over 
this period there has been a general decline in the reference value 
for the long term interest rate. In 1996 only three countries, Greece, 
Italy and Portugal, failed to have a long term interest rate below 
the reference value. In general these countries failed to satisfy the 
reference value throughout the period identified. Forecasts for 
1997 are provided from the European Commission, the OECD 
and the Economist Intelligence Unit.
Table 3 suggests that there has been a clear process of 
convergence of long term interest rates across EU countries over 
the period identified with a noticeable decline over the period 
1991-96. This is anticipated to continue during 1997. This general 
downward trend was only interrupted in 1994 when rising yields 
on the US market resulted in a comparable steep rise in long term 
interest rates in the EU. A combination of factors appears to have 
accounted for this general downward trend. In some countries 
inflation expectations appear to have decreased while an 
important role also seems to have been played by a reduction in 
risk premia. The decrease in risk premia may be attributed to a 
change in financial markets' perceptions of longer term progress 
towards price stability, related factors such as ongoing efforts 
towards fiscal consolidation, the stability of exchange rates and a 
decrease in political uncertainty. Improved expectations regarding 
prospects for monetary union has also played a role. For 
individual countries, the outturns may be interpreted as an 



































O N N o o o o o N o ^ o o ^ c o q o N n  l o  
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developments in those member states showing no or only very 
small differences in long term interest rates. This is particularly 
the case for Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and Austria. In countries whose rates remain above 
the reference value namely Greece, Italy, Portugal and possibly 
Spain, although a significant convergence of yields has occurred, 
differentials still remain wide which indicates that progress 
towards overall convergence needs to be strengthened. However, 
more recently a general acceleration of the convergence of long 
term interest rates has been observed. This has been particularly 
the case in those countries whose long term interest rates stand 
above the reference value during the year 1996. For 1997 country 
specific factors -  such as inflation expectations and changing risk 
premia, and thereby issues related to sustainabiltiy as well as 
prospects relating to EMU will play an important role.
The European Commission predicts that Greece, Spain, Italy 
and Portugal will be unable to achieve the reference value in 1997, 
however the EIU is more optimistic forecasting that only Greece 
and Italy will fail to meet the anticipated reference value of 8.5%. 
The OECD forecast is incomplete but tends to take a more 
optimistic view of prospective developments in 1997.
Financial sustainability
In terms of attaining the Maastricht criteria it is particularly in 
regard to the attainment of fiscal sustainability that major 
difficulties are arising.7 From the early 1990s there was a 
substantial deterioration in the public finances of nearly all of the 
EU countries. As a result the average fiscal deficit for the EU as a 
whole widened rapidly from 2.4% of GDP in 1989 to a high of
7 A recent formalisation by EU members to sustain efforts towards fiscal 
consolidation was made in the form of a "Stability and Growth Pact" in 
December 1996 at the Dublin Summit.
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6.2% in 1993. At that point in time most countries faced major 
challenges in reversing what was an unsustainable trend. 
Responding to this EU member governments have taken intensive 
measures in an effort to place their deficits on a downward path. 
This has included cuts to welfare and general government 
expenditure. Traditional sizeable welfare state spending in 
Europe, the recession of the 1980s and 1990s, and the high 
interest rates following Germany's unification, have increased the 
size of government deficits. The cuts in government spending 
required to attain the Maastricht fiscal sustainability criteria will 
be painful in terms of lost jobs and cuts to welfare expenditure at 
a time of already very high rates of unemployment in the EU. 
Such problems have recently come to the fore in both France in
1995 and 1997 with the election of a socialist government 
committed to the creation of jobs where necessary at the expense 
of the criteria on budget deficits and Germany in 1996. In the case 
of Germany, for example, its projected unemployment rate of
11.1%8 in 1997 will put intense pressure on government 
expenditure and the budget deficit and public sector debt. 
Germany's budget deficit in particular is likely to exceed the 
Maastricht criteria in 1997, and particularly given the 
Bundesbank's rejection of a revaluation of the country's gold 
reserves as a means of generating additional government revenue.
Table 4 indicates the nature of the difficulty facing EU 
members in regard to the fiscal criteria, specifically in regard to 
that of the General Government budget deficit. It is clear from this 
table the number of occasions that EU members have failed to 
achieve the 3% budget deficit criteria. In 1995, for example, only 
Denmark and Ireland achieved a budget deficit of less than 3% of 
GDP while Luxembourg achieved a surplus. In eight of the other 
countries government imbalances were reduced, and in some cases
OECD, June 1997.
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quite noticeably. However for Germany, Spain, the Netherlands 
and Austria the deficit situation worsened. During 1996 only five 
countries had deficits less than 3% of GDP or a budget surplus, 
namely Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg. All other EU member states achieved a reduction in 
budget deficits although most were still well above the reference 
value with the exception of Germany which experienced a further 
deterioration.
The performance of EU countries in terms of their budgets in 
1997, and their ability to sustain this in 1998, will be crucial in the 
determination of which countries will form EMU. In this regard 
the European Commission takes a very optimistic position in its 
latest projections,9 anticipating that only Greece and France will 
fail to achieve the reference value for 1997. The most pessimistic 
position is taken by the EIU which anticipates that in addition to 
these countries Italy, Germany, Portugal, Spain and the UK will 
also fail to satisfy the criteria. The OECD takes a more middle 
ground anticipating that Greece, Italy, France and Germany will 
fail to satisfy the criteria. It is now largely accepted by the 
government of France that it will fail to satisfy the criteria, and 
the position for Germany, Greece as well as Italy will remain 
difficult. A majority view would suggest that these four countries 
are most in danger of not satisfying the Maastricht criteria. 
However the Treaty does allow for such countries to still comply 
if the ratio has declined substantially and continuously and 
reached a level that comes close to the reference value, or, 
alternatively, the excess over the reference value is only 
exceptional and temporary and the ratio remains close to the 
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also be taken into consideration. This being so Italy presents a 
major problem according to the EC, and Italy Austria and Greece 
according to the OECD.
Table 5 summarises developments over the period 1991-98 in 
terms of government debt. Over this period of time it is apparent 
that most members have failed to achieve the reference value, and 
in a number of cases to a significant degree. For several countries 
there has over this period been a trend towards high and rising 
government debt to GDP ratios, and this persisted through 1995 
and 1996. This underlies the pressing need for reinforcing fiscal 
consolidation. According to the European Commission's autumn
1996 forecast, EU wide government debt was expected to reach 
73.5% of GDP in 1996 which would be almost twice as high as in
1980. A particularly marked increase in this ratio occurred in the 
early 1990s under the influence of a vicious circle of ever 
increasing debt interest payments, deficits and further debts. The 
focus of such a development has shifted towards issues related to 
the sustainability of government finances. In this respect the major 
emphasis is on future challenges such as the need to reduce 
current high debt ratios and to cope with the growing burden of 
social security old age pensions. The growing burden of debt 
service obligations tends to crowd out non interest expenditures 
and makes national government budgets increasingly vulnerable to 
exchange rate and interest rate volatility. This is mostly the case 
when the debt is at short maturity or is indexed to short term 
interest rates.
Only five member states attained a position below the 
reference value of 60% of GDP in 1995, namely Germany, France, 
Luxembourg, Finland and the UK. Of the ten remaining members 
with a debt ratio above the reference value only Ireland and 
Denmark achieved a major reduction while Belgium, Italy and 
Sweden attained a slight decline. For 1996 the debt ratio fell 
slightly for Finland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Denmark, Sweden
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and Italy, but noticeably more so for Belgium and Ireland. 
However it increased in Germany, Spain, Austria, France, 
Luxembourg, Greece and the UK. In 1996 only four member states 
achieved a debt ratio below the 60% reference value, namely 
France, Luxembourg Finland and the UK. However the key year 
again will be the performance of these countries in 1997, as well 
as the anticipated performance in 1998. Projections by the 
European Commission, the OECD and the EIU are contained in 
Table 5, and do not make optimistic reading. Even for the more 
optimistic European Commission, only Finland, France, 
Luxembourg and the UK are likely to satisfy the strict reference 
value of 60% in 1997. The OECD projections also come to the 
same conclusion. In the case of the EIU only France, Luxembourg 
and the UK will satisfy the criteria. Projections for 1998 from the 
EC would add Ireland to this list. However as with the case of 
government deficits an EU country can still qualify for 
membership of EMU if the ratio of government debt to GDP is 
sufficiently dimirushing and approaching the reference value at a 
'satisfactory' pace. On this basis a majority view of the three 
forecasts would suggest that Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden, along with 
Finland, France, Luxembourg and the UK would satisfy this 
criteria. Only Germany and possibly Austria would have 
difficulty in satisfying this criteria. However the EC appears to be 
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In 1994 only Luxembourg and Germany satisfied the fiscal 
convergence criteria in full but by 1995 and 1996 only 
Luxembourg did so. The above financial sustainability analysis 
suggests that progress towards fiscal consolidation has generally 
been very slow. To attain the Maastricht criteria in this regard will 
require a faster correction of fiscal imbalances. Most countries 
have not achieved a situation that could be judged as sustainable 
in the medium term as indicated by worrisome debt 
developments. To produce a virtuous circle of a continuously 
diminishing debt ratio the authorities will need to achieve and 
maintain a sufficiently high primary surplus. This will require 
decisive corrective measures that are primarily directed at cutting 
expenditure, which could reward governments with lower interest 
rates and thereby reduce the interest payable on government debt. 
For countries with a legacy of high debt ratios this implies aiming 
for an extended period of overall budget balance or surpluses to 
correct earlier fiscal excesses. One off deficit improvement 
measures will be insufficient to ensure sustainable consolidation. 
The need to sustain such efforts towards consolidation has been 
formalised in the form of a "stability and growth pact" among EU 
members agreed at the Dublin summit of December 1996, which 
would apply in the period after monetary union was achieved. 
Under this arrangement countries that run excessive budget 
deficits, in excess of the 3% of GDP convergence criteria under the 
Maastricht Treaty, will be subject to fines, unless they experience 
a natural disaster or a fall in GDP of a least 2% over a year. In 
cases where GDP has fallen between 0.75% and 2% EU Finance 
Ministers will have discretion as to the imposition of penalties. By 
implication those with a fall of GDP by less than 0.75% will 
automatically be subject to fines. Such fines would be substantial 
amounting to 0.2% of GDP for a breach of the 3% ceiling with a 
further 0.1% for each further 1% breach of the ceiling up to a
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maximum of 0.5% of GDP. The scale of these fines, while less 
than that originally proposed by Germany, are still substantial.
What, then, are the prospects for the complete monetary 
integration of the EU. It is difficult to conceive the economic and 
political conditions that would enable all EU countries to become 
members of the currency union by 1999. Indeed by the end of 
1996, in conjunction with the projections for 1997, the prospects 
for monetary union among EU members look bleak particularly if 
the convergence criteria were to be strictly applied. Without 
German and French membership from the outset the process of 
attaining monetary union does not look credible. It is clear that a 
number of countries would wish to proceed, if possible, with the 
full implementation of the Maastricht Treaty. At least France, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg would wish 
to form a monetary union, and it is also possible to envisage 
Ireland and Denmark joining this group of countries. This will 
inevitably result in the emergence of a "two-speed" or "multi track" 
Europe. However the emergence of a "two-speed" Europe would 
not be without cost and would certainly be resisted particularly 
by the member countries excluded from moving on the fast lane. 
But even this development, based upon the recent performance of 
the member states in regard to financial sustainability, may only 
be possible if the starting date for EMU is postponed or the 
convergence criteria liberally interpreted.
5. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC
AND MONETARY UNION
While the consequences of economic and monetary union has 
dominated political and economic debate in Europe over a 
number of years, only recently has attention focused upon an 
analysis of its global implications (see OECD (1997). The creation 
of a single currency in the EU will represent the biggest change in
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global monetary arrangements since the demise of the Bretton 
Woods arrangement of fixed exchange rates in the early 1970s. 
The extent of its impact on the rest of the world will depend upon 
two related issues. Firstly, the extent of the challenge by the euro 
to the US dollar as the world's major foreign exchange reserve 
currency, and secondly the consequences of EMU upon the 
stability of the global monetary system.10 In regard to the former 
the potential for the euro to play an important role as an 
international unit of account will depend on several factors: the 
relative weight in both total global output and trade of the euro 
area; the relative stability of domestic prices in the euro area; the 
comparative macroeconomic performance of the euro area with 
that of other global economic blocs such as Japan and the USA; 
the existence of large and liquid euro financial markets; and 
exporters' and importers' preferences. While the extent of these 
developments is difficult to anticipate they are likely to exert a 
major bearing upon the stability of the global monetary system 
overall, and are therefore too big to ignore.
Table 6 uses a number of economic indicators to identify the 
global significance of the EU, and to compare and contrast its 
performance with that of the two other major global economic 
blocs, the USA and Japan, during the period of the 1990s. On the 
basis of these measures the influence of the European Union is 
substantial. The EU single market and currency area, assuming all 
EU members participate, will consist of an economy which is 
roughly comparable in size to that of the USA based on 1991 PPP 
rates, and about 18 per cent larger based on 1996 exchange rates
10 The prospect of a single currency, however, has not gone unnoticed 
amongst foreign multinationals with extensive involvement in Europe. 
Toyota, for example, provoked a furore in the UK in January 1997 by 
indicating that the company might redirect its European investment to 
continental Europe if the UK stayed out of EMU. While Toyota has since 
re-affirmed its commitment to the UK, it showed that foreign investment 
could be influenced by developments in EMU.
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and prices. It is noticeable that the average performance of these 
three major economic blocs differed only slightly during the period 
of the 1990s. The average growth rate of GDP in the EU area was 
between that of the USA and Japan while inflation was 
noticeably higher in the EU area. It is anticipated that once EMU 
is established in the EU, in conjunction with a European Central 
Bank having price stability as its primary objective, that this will 
lead to convergence of lower inflation in the area. The average 
unemployment rate during the period of the 1990s was noticeably 
higher in the EU, representing its major economic policy challenge, 
arising from structural rigidities in markets, particularly that of 
the labour market. Public sector debt in the EU is lower than that 
in Japan but higher than that in the USA. Gross national saving is 
considerably higher in Japan in comparison to that of the EU and 
USA with the EU performance better than that of the USA. A 
common characteristic shared by the three economic blocs is that 
they are not overly exposed to adverse trade developments, with 
their trade balances, either positive or negative, being a small 
proportion of overall GDP. Only Japan of the three blocs achieved 
an average current account surplus during the period of the 1990s. 
These three blocs are, however, major exporters, with the EU, 
excluding intra EU trade, being the world's main exporter with a 
19% share of world exports compared to a 16% share for the 
USA and a 12% share for Japan in 1996 (OECD).
If backed by a credible monetary policy there is the prospect 
that the euro will eventually play a more important role than its 
constituent European currencies do today. The clear mandate of 
the European Central Bank (ECB) to achieve price stability will 
contribute considerably to this development. Such a policy 
priority will enhance the attractiveness of the euro as a reserve 
currency for central banks, and financial markets will be more 
willing to conduct transactions in the new currency. Both of these 
changes will occur mainly at the expense of the US dollar. The
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extent of initial use of the euro as a reserve currency will depend 
upon its perceived strength and stability after its launch. EU 
officials have predicted that the euro's anti-inflationary 
credentials and the existence of large and liquid euro 
denominated markets will make it attractive. While the US dollar 
may continue to be the first choice, European currencies will 
continue to gain ground. As indicated in Table 7, 71.1% of central 
banks' reserves consisted of US dollars in 1983 compared with 
61.5% by 1996. The share taken by European currencies increased 
from 15.8% to 20.1% over the same period. The euro will improve 
further upon these figures should price stability improvements be 
anticipated. On the other hand admitting countries that do not 
satisfy the EMU convergence criteria, and the likelihood that 
"softer" economies will join at the currency's launch, could result 
in the emergence of a 'soft' euro. This would make it less 
attractive compared to the US dollar and the yen. But there is 
major disagreement over how quickly such developments are 
likely to occur, and indeed over whether the euro will ultimately 
usurp the dollar as the primary reserve currency.
The attractiveness of the euro as an international currency will 
also depend on the development of domestic financial markets. 
The advent of EMU will initiate significant structural change in 
financial markets not least because of the elimination of exchange 
rate risk between the participating countries. The extension of the 
single market to financial services will also have the effect of 
breaking down national barriers and setting in motion competitive 
forces that should greatly improve the efficiency of financial 
markets. How efficient they become as a result of this process will 
have a bearing on the international demand for euros.
The extent of currency instability arising from a portfolio shift 
by central banks and investors into euros would depend upon 
both the size and speed with which it takes place. A sudden 
surge in demand for the euro would cause it to appreciate
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rapidly, and temporarily, above its long run equilibrium level. 
Such an overshooting of the currency would result in a loss of 
international competitiveness and a deterioration of the EU's 
current account deficits, a reduction in real interest rates and a 
consequential depreciation of the currency. In addition, policy 
decisions within Europe could further exacerbate the volatility of 
the euro. For example, EMU governments, having given up the 
right to an independent monetary policy, may resort to an 
expansionary fiscal policy11 despite the existence of the "stability 
and growth pact" designed to avoid this. However the European 
Central Bank, concerned with establishing its own credibility in 
terms of implementing an anti inflation policy, is likely to 
implement a tight monetary policy. Such a combination of policies 
is likely to lead to an impact upon the euro similar to that upon 
the US dollar in the early 1980s under the Reagan administration. 
The euro would as a consequence appreciate strongly as 
international investors switched into euro denominated assets 
contributing further to global exchange rate volatility. Currency 
instability arising from these potential developments could be 
mitigated by appropriate action by central banks should they be 
the major initiators of a reshuffling of asset portfolios. Such 
action would involve a more gradual adjustment of reserves. 
However it is likely that temporarily, at least, exchange rate 
volatility will increase. This could become permanent arising from 
the fact that because trade among EMU members will be 
transacted in a common currency, hence international trade will 
become smaller, European policy makers may pay less attention 
to exchange rates than they now do. This could result in greater 
instability.
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It has been suggested that one way to minimise exchange rate 
instability is for a more formal system of currency cooperation 
between the world's major economies. However for Europe there 
would be uncertainty over who should cooperate. At its start 
EMU 'will not include all EU members. The relationship between 
the 'ins' and the 'outs' will affect the potential for broader 
coordination as well as currency stability within Europe. In 
addition the technicalities of policy cooperation will not be easy. 
The European Central Bank will control monetary policy, EMU’s 
finance ministers will have a say on exchange rate policy, and 
fiscal policy will, within limits, stay in the hands of individual 
European governments. Policy coordination, at least initially, 
would be far from straightforward. That alone may make the 
international monetary system less stable.
Once EMU is established, however, the growth in the euro's 
role as an international currency is, on balance, likely to be more 
gradual. Market participants will want to wait until actual 
monetary and fiscal policies are in place and the stability of the 
euro is firmly established. Furthermore, inertia will likely work in 
favour of a continuation of the dominant role of the dollar for 
some time. On the other hand there are factors which suggest that 
the US dollar's position is still likely to remain dominant. This 
arises partly from the dollar's international attraction due to the 
size, depth and liquidity of the US's capital markets. The US's 
market for domestic securities, for example, is twice as large as 
the combined markets of the EU economies. Despite rapidly 
increasing financial integration in Europe the US's supremacy is 
unlikely to be realistically challenged. However some economists12 
anticipate that between 30% and 40% of global financial assets 
will end up denominated in euros, between 40% and 50% in US 
dollars, and the rest in yen and a few other currencies. This
12 F. Bergsten, director, Institute for International Economics, Washington, at 
a symposium held by the International Monetary Fund.
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implies a shift of between US$500 billion and US$1 trillion into 
euros, primarily out of US dollars, as investors and central banks 
reshuffle their portfolios.
Finally, because of its size, fiscal and monetary policies 
conducted in the EMU area are likely to have a significant impact 
on the macroeconomic environment in the rest of the world. Key 
transmission mechanisms from the conduct of macroeconomic 
and structural policies in the euro area to the rest of the world 
will work through exchange rate and interest rate developments.
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The European Union has made significant advances towards the 
attainment of economic and monetary union. EMU has been set 
down for 1 January, 1999 at the latest for those countries that 
achieve the Maastricht convergence criteria, although considerable 
difficulties exist in terms of achieving the fiscal sustainability 
criteria in particular. This involves the attainment of a budget 
deficit of less than 3% of GDP and a public sector debt of less 
than 60% of GDP. The most likely outcome will be a two track 
EMU within the EU, where some members have satisfied the 
conditions for EMU while others have not. This could cause major 
difficulties for those members excluded from initial membership, 
and exacerbate existing differences between them and those 
countries included in EMU.
The issue of whether the EU constitutes an optimum currency 
area was considered as well as whether there is the need for real 
convergence criteria to be satisfied before EMU membership is 
finally decided. Optimum currency area theory would suggest 
that the use of real convergence criteria to decide membership has 
strong foundations. This theory would emphasise the need for a 
high degree of mobility of factors of production, a high degree of 
economic openness, diversification of production structures and
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similarity of production structures across prospective members. 
With the exchange rate no longer available to play a key role in 
the adjustment to external shocks, greater reliance will be placed 
upon price and wage flexibility, mobility of production factors
• and fiscal instruments to reduce regional disparities. Should these 
adjustment mechanisms be inoperative or weak there are likely to 
be adverse regional differences and social and political tension 
arising from asymmetrical shocks which could prove too strong 
for the maintenance of the monetary union.
A clear picture does not emerge from recent empirical evidence 
as to whether the EU countries constitute an optimum currency 
area. However it does tend to show that real convergence is 
discernible in a core group of countries around Germany, including 
the Benelux countries, France and Austria in particular. In terms 
of the cyclical correlation of their economies Denmark, Spain and 
Italy also appear to have become closer to this core group of 
nations during the 1990s. On the other hand the economies of the 
UK, Ireland, Greece, Sweden, Finland and Portugal appear to 
have become less integrated with the economies of the core 
nations, and for some of these the correlation is actually a 
negative one. Hence a distinct core-periphery division appears to 
exist making the task of monetary union for the whole of the EU 
unlikely at present. Hence a two track Europe is most likely. The 
empirical evidence also appears to suggest that there is very low 
labour mobility in Europe indicative of segmented labour markets. 
High unemployment rates across most of the EU countries is also 
indicative of a lack of labour market flexibility. The existence of 
such deficiencies in the operation of labour markets in Europe 
does not bode well for the prospects of successful monetary 
union.
The establishment of a single currency within the EMU area 
will have a profound impact not only upon EU participants and 
non participants but also for the rest of the world. There is the
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prospect of the establishment of a reserve currency, the euro, 
which has the potential to rival that of the US dollar. The size of 
the EU economy, its significant role in international trade, the 
ECB's commitment to price stability and the potential growth of 
euro financial markets suggest that the demand for the euro could 
be substantial. This will arise from world central banks 
diversifying into the new currency as well as that of private 
financial investors, and in the process have important 
implications for the volatility of world financial markets and 
exchange rates that cannot be ignored.
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